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ABSTRACT
Laboratory safety has recently become more of an imperative in research
laboratories than it has ever been in the past. Recent accidents at several universities
have escalated the awareness of safety concerns in laboratory workspaces among the
general public and created a greater need for a stronger culture of safety in chemistry
research overall. Historically, results and publications have been the top priority of most
researchers, not laboratory safety.
This thesis discusses a number of laboratory accidents. The first happened in
December of 2008 at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and resulted in
the death of a graduate student researcher. Many safety concerns and violations
contributed to the fatality. The second accident happened in June of 2014 at the
University of Minnesota (UMN). This incident involved an explosion in a fume hood
that caused injuries to the researcher as well as a great deal of damage to the hood and
experimental setup. Various minor incidents at the University of Vermont (UVM) are
also discussed with regards to the effects on laboratory safety at the university.
Universities around the country have been able to learn from these accidents in
order to prevent similar occurrences in the future. These accidents and their safety
ramifications at UCLA, UMN, and UVM are the focus of this thesis. The safety
programs at each of these universities are examined and compared with respect to how
the incidents have facilitated necessary changes. Finally, future goals and opportunities
for the safety program at UVM are suggested.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. A Brief History of Safety in the Literature
Laboratory safety has become more of an imperative in research laboratories than
it ever has been.1-4 This change is partially due to recent high profile accidents at
prestigious universities that have increased the awareness of safety concerns in laboratory
workspaces to the general public.5
There have been numerous journal articles in recent years specifically regarding
laboratory safety and ways of generating a more pronounced culture of safety in
academic institutions, both in safety education6-9 and basic laboratory safety.1,

3, 10-11

However, there are only a few articles from the early 1900s that strictly deal with general
laboratory safety.12-17 These articles are outdated based on modern safety standards,
though there were various tips and ideas that are still useful in chemistry laboratories
today.

For example, a discussion of how to properly store potentially hazardous

chemicals appeared in 1925.13 The article discusses detailed demonstrations to perform
for researchers to understand their laboratory hazards and how improper storage could
create a laboratory fire. One such example was to form a flat disk of dried ammonium
nitrate on an asbestos sheet, cover with a layer of dried zinc dust, put one drop of water in
a hollow in the chemicals, and wait for there to be a reaction.12 There are other ways of
describing what improper storage could lead to in a laboratory, but as Davison points out
in the article, “the thought of safety in storage will be quickened by those who try out
some of the demonstrations here recorded.”12 As safety progressed into being a higher
1

concern in laboratories, these types of demonstrations became obsolete as much as
unnecessarily risky.
As initially pointed out in the article, one portion of any safety program should
include proper chemical storage. There are various charts and tables that are available to
help determine how chemicals should be stored and with which other chemicals.18-20
Such distinctions highlight two aspects to storage, reactivity of different classes of
chemicals and regulations (including requirements such as labeling). Some charts focus
more on the reactivity of different classes of chemicals or two individual chemicals.18 For
instance, the tables on the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) website give
examples of what chemicals should not be stored together (e.g. cyanides and acids).18 The
University of Vermont (UVM) and the University of Minnesota (UMN) focus on the
specific storage of the chemicals but in conjunction with how to properly label the
containers.19-20 UMN in particular focuses a good deal on the regulatory reasoning for
why chemicals need to be where and how they are stored, referencing the Laboratory
Safety Plan, Employee Right to Know, and the National Fire Protection Association in
the storage guide.19
Another article from 1925 concentrated on treating students that had been
exposed to a poisonous chemical.13 There are suggested treatment options that include
counteracting the ingested poison with other chemicals. A treatment of “alkalies” is
suggested, “[giving] dilute acid, hydrochloric, acetic, vinegar, lemon juice, orange juice
or a fixed oil” among others to the exposed researcher.13 Among the options medical
2

attention is not included, which would be the principal suggestion today. Many of the
suggested treatment options directly oppose what current safety data sheets (SDS)
describe as best practices for what should, or should not, be done. For instance, there is a
disparity between the article and the current SDS for sulfuric acid. Turner’s article
suggests inducing vomiting, which is in conflict with the SDS: “Rinse mouth. Do NOT
induce vomiting.”13, 21 This article is most similar to potential trainings researchers may
receive regarding what to do in an emergency. In emergency response training at the
University of Vermont, various emergencies are discussed, including what to do in case
of exposure, fire, injury, etc.a Turner’s article, though the information is outdated, was in
an attempt to make researchers more proactive and prepared for any actuality.
Key lessons to take away from these early articles related to laboratory safety are
that there is always a need for emergency preparedness and there is always room for
improvement, especially as new information becomes available. At the time the articles
were published, the suggestions and information would likely have been the best
available. Rather than using prior practices because they are established, awareness
about current laboratory safety developments and the hazards involved needs to be
increased to mitigate risk.

a

The list of topics discussed in emergency response trainings is from UVM’s safety
training, “Emergency Response for Laboratory Workers.”
3

1.2. Thesis Goals
The analysis of recent serious accidents at the University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) and the University of Minnesota (UMN) is the initial focus of this
thesis. The safety programs at these two universities and the University of Vermont
(UVM) will be compared and contrasted as well as accidents at all three universities.
Once the similarities and differences have been discussed, future goals and opportunities
will be suggested for UVM.
The goal of this analysis is to determine gaps in the safety program at UVM with
regards to the program modifications made over the last five years at UVM, UCLA, and
UMN. The safety gaps and areas for improvement are to be informed by the incidents at
the three universities.

1.3. References
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CHAPTER 2: University of California, Los Angeles
2.1. Incident Description
On December 29, 2008, during the holiday break, a deadly accident occurred at
UCLA that was preventable. The researcher involved in the accident was scaling up a
reaction she had performed that October after starting work in Professor Harran’s
laboratory.1 The reaction, according to her notebook, is shown in Figure 1. The initial
step of the reaction was to generate vinyl lithium via the reaction of vinyl bromide with
two equivalents of tert-butyl lithium (tBuLi).1

Figure 1: TOP reaction: Synthesis of vinyl lithium from the reaction of vinyl bromide and tBuLi.
BOTTOM reaction: Targeted synthesis of 4-hydroxy-4-vinyldecane from vinyl lithium and 4decanone.

As mentioned, when the reaction had been completed in October, it was on a
smaller scale. In that run, anhydrous ether (28 mL) was added to a dry 200 mL round
bottom flask. Vinyl bromide (3.0 mL) was added to the anhydrous ether in the flask and
stirred at –78 °C. After 15 minutes, 53.79 mL of 1.67 M tBuLi in pentane was added to
the mixture and stirred for another 2 hours, followed by increasing the temperature of the
solution to 0 °C for 30 minutes, and finally returning the solution to –78 °C. In a separate
7

flask, ether (6 mL) and 4-decanone (3.90 mL) were mixed, cooled, and transferred to the
flask containing the solution of vinyl lithium. The reaction was stirred at –78 °C for two
hours. The temperature was then increased to –10 °C before quenching the excess tBuLi
with sodium bicarbonate. This reaction yielded 3.60 g of 4-hydroxy-4-vinyldecane at
86.75% crude yield.1 In December, the objective was to increase the reaction scale to
produce an overall yield of about three times as much product.
The reaction in December required the researcher to use 159.5 mL of 1.69 M
tBuLi in pentane. The total volume was obtained using a 60 mL syringe to measure
approximately 50 mL at a time in three additional steps. The researcher was working in a
fume hood (Figure 2) with a Schlenk line. Also located in the hood, there was an open
flask of hexane.

8

Figure 2: The fume hood that was used by the researcher at the time of the incident.

The initial problem began when the plunger came out of the syringe and the tBuLi, a
known pyrophoric reagent at the concentration. The solution ignited when it came into
contact with air. When this happened, the flask of hexane was spilled and the solvent
ignited. Unfortunately, the researcher was wearing neither a flame-resistant laboratory
coat nor other protective clothing, and her sweater caught fire. Though there was a safety
shower in the laboratory, it was not used. Instead, another researcher in the laboratory
tried to smother the flames on the researcher with his laboratory coat. When this did not
appear to be working, he poured water on her from a nearby laboratory sink.2
9

Throughout the incident, the researcher was reported to be conscious and even
speaking at times to the other members of her group.1 When the emergency responders
arrived on the scene, the fire was extinguished though the damage was already done (see
Figure 3 for the damage to the laboratory alone).

Figure 3: The burn marks on the floor from the fire after the 2008 UCLA laboratory death.

The medical personnel used the safety shower for decontamination of the researcher, then
she was brought to UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center, and finally, she was
transferred to Grossman Burn Center — over 40% of her body was covered in 3rd degree

10

burns. She died about two-and-a-half weeks later, on January 16, 2009, due to the
injuries she suffered on that day.1

2.2. Ramifications from the Incident
There were many legal and non-legal implications for both the university and the
laboratory supervisor resulting from this incident. However, aside from the legal details,
the potential dangers of working in a chemistry laboratory were thrust into the public’s
view. This story made headlines nationwide in chemistry journals and among chemists,
but also in mainstream news outlets.3 This incident was something that could not be
ignored and for good reason.
2.2.1. Legal Ramifications for the University
In 2009, the California Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(Cal/OSHA) determined that the accident was a result of safety lapses and inadequate
training.2,

4

The researcher’s training should have minimally included how to properly

handle pyrophoric reagents including tBuLi as well as where to find the emergency
equipment and how to use it if necessary (e.g., the safety shower). For the university, this
resulted in the required creation of a $500,000 scholarship in the researcher’s name and a
complete overhaul of the safety program (Section 2.2.3).2 Cal/OSHA’s investigation cited
poor training, poor technique/improper method, lack of supervision, employees not
wearing required personal protective equipment (PPE), and flammable liquids and
volatile chemicals stored improperly.1, 5 The lengthy list of citations highlighted the need
11

for many of the changes that were consequently made to the safety program at UCLA as
a direct result of the investigation.
Aside from the costs of the scholarship and safety program adjustments, the
university was required to pay legal fees. Though there was no direct punitive action
against UCLA, the legal fees alone were about $4.5 million covering both the university
and the principle investigator (PI) for the laboratory.6-7 In comparison to what the
university has spent on laboratory safety increases, updates, and required changes, the
legal fees were small.

The laboratory safety adjustments have cost the university

upwards of $20 million dollars as of October 2014.7 The use of this money, in updates
consistent with current best practices, will be outlined subsequently in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.2. Legal Ramifications for the Laboratory Supervisor
Separate from the penalties against the university—including the scholarship and
changes to the safety program—the laboratory supervisor, or principle investigator (PI),
was charged with four felony counts of willful violation of state occupational health and
safety standards in the December of 2011, the first time in which a PI faced criminal
charges for failure to meet standards.6 As a result, this incident was reported in
mainstream media coverage.3 Many of Cal/OSHA’s citations, mentioned above, were
debated throughout the legal case with the PI. For instance, as laboratory supervisor, the
professor is responsible for any training that is required for researchers working in the
laboratory.8 The supervisor does not necessarily need to deliver the trainings personally,
but he or she must ensure that required trainings have been completed before work
12

commences. The case against Professor Harran was settled after the better part of five
years in June of 2014.

Two punitive results of the settlement were 800 hours of

community service and a $10,000 fine to be paid to the burn unit where the researcher
was treated.8 Other outcomes from the trial require Professor Harran to teach a
preparatory organic chemistry course to inner city high school graduates and speak about
laboratory safety to new graduate students in the chemistry department at UCLA.8
When researching this accident and its subsequent outcomes, it was evident that a
dialogue had been started involving both chemists and non-chemists. The community
responded to not only the outcome but also the progression of the case as it was
happening. Some responses to the case’s outcome were that the researcher should be
responsible for him/herself and know the reagents and hazards that will be handled before
running any experiment.8 However, most responses questioned if the penalties were
enough of a punishment for what happened, explaining that the PI should have been more
aware of the safety concerns in his laboratory and trained his researchers accordingly.9-13
This case has had such a large impact on the safety at UCLA as well as the safety culture
around the country. For this reason, some commented that the penalties against Harran
were not severe enough.9-13 Legally, the laboratory supervisor is ultimately responsible
for what happens in his laboratory.6 Thus, if someone is injured due to improper
technique or training, ignorance regarding the use of safety equipment, or a similar lack
of knowledge regarding laboratory hazards, the researcher’s current supervisor is

13

responsible, regardless of any training a given researcher may have received at another
institution.
The legal side of the argument also varied greatly. Some contended that Professor
Harran should not have been initially charged so severely.10, 12 Others debated whether
the outcome of this case would be a cause for change at any universities outside of
California.10,

12-13

Since this was the first time a PI was criminally charged due to a

laboratory accident, there are likely repercussions that will not be known until future
accidents occur at universities.
2.2.3. Safety Program Ramifications
Because Cal/OSHA found that the accident was a result of safety lapses and
inadequate training, the safety program and culture at UCLA were examined very
thoroughly by the school and Cal/OSHA, among other interested parties.3 It was
determined that the proper protocol was not being followed at the time of the incident.
According to the laboratory supervisor, the laboratory workers follow Sigma-Aldrich
“Technical Bulletin AL-134” regarding the safe handling of air-sensitive reagents,
including tBuLi.14 According to the protocol, glassware used with pyrophoric materials is
dried in an oven rather than flame-dried, which was the method used according to the
researcher’s notebook. Either method should remove any water adsorbed to the surface
of the glassware; however, flame-drying was not part of the accepted Sigma-Aldrich
protocol the laboratory had adopted. For small quantity transfers (up to 50 mL), a

14

syringe is acceptable to use for the transfer but only when using a 1–2 foot long needle.
The needle that was utilized was 1.5 inches long and can be seen in Figure 4.1, 14

Figure 4: The syringe and 1.5” needle used for the transfer of tBuLi on the day of the UCLA
accident.

A needle this short would require a different method than what is described in the
technical bulletin of obtaining the tBuLi from the primary container. A longer needle
would be able to reach the bottom of the bottle easily, thereby avoiding the need to invert
the bottle, which could damage the septum or create a risk of dropping the flask (see
Figure 5).

15

Figure 5: Figures from the Sigma Aldrich Technical Bulletin AL-134 describing the proper technique
for transferring pyrophoric reagents using a syringe equipped with a 1-2’ needle.

Through no more than 50 mL was transferred at any given time, a cannula transfer would
have been the more accepted method to transfer the total amount required, 159.5 mL.
Using a cannula would have allowed the researcher to maintain an inert atmosphere while
handling the pyrophoric materials as little as possible. Exposure can more easily be
avoided with the use of a cannula.14
The specifics mentioned above regarding changes to and/or enforcement of the
protocol are minor changes in the program as compared to the broader transformation
UCLA’s safety program experienced. One month following the accident, inspections
were performed in over 300 laboratories at the university, many in the chemistry
16

department. At the top of the list of operational problems was the lack of documentation
concerning how many total laboratories and researchers were on campus.15 In a large
campus with laboratories spread out among multiple buildings (Figure 6), this is not
necessarily surprising, though it is a serious problem.

Figure 6: Map of UCLA’s main campus with laboratory buildings denoted with red pins.16

A Laboratory Safety Committee was created, and within six months of the
incident, five ambitious recommendations were laid out for the university. These five
recommendations involved 1) the development of a safety culture at the university that
17

would generate safer laboratories, 2) the increase of training and outreach, 3) the increase
of accountability and oversight of the safety staff, 4) the change to make safety a top
priority in laboratory design, and 5) the increase of the accuracy and amount of
inventories and recordkeeping in laboratories on campus.15,

17-18

Once these were

enumerated, UCLA needed to overcome a major hurdle: there was a large disconnect and
lack of trust between the safety department/staff and the laboratory researchers. A
partnership between safety staff and laboratory researchers was emphasized as the
ultimate goal of this portion of safety culture at UCLA.15
One major change that increased the partnership between safety staff and
laboratory researchers was the implementation of a standardized inspection procedure.15
Regardless of what kinds of hazards are present in the laboratory being inspected
(chemical, biological, radioactive, etc.), the inspection questions and, ultimately, the
report are either the same or comparable. When there is less freedom to personalize
inspections, there is greater accountability from each inspector. Uniform inspection
documents ensure systematic expectations for researchers and their laboratories,
regardless if the same inspector performs each inspection every year. Additionally,
senior laboratory safety officers within the safety department at UCLA double-check the
laboratory inspections and make random selections to re-inspect various laboratories.
This duplication by separate safety officers guarantees reproducibility of the results and
determines where there are gaps to be filled.

18

After the investigations by Cal/OSHA and UCLA, the Chemical Safety Board
(CSB) also weighed in on the incident.

The CSB released a video entitled

“Experimenting with Danger” that discussed three chemistry laboratory incidents: the
fatal incident at UCLA that has been discussed in this thesis, a fatal accidental poisoning
at Dartmouth College in 1997, and an explosion at Texas Tech University that severely
injured a graduate student in January 2010.5, 19-20 This video focused on why the incidents
occurred, e.g. lack of training, improper use of personal protective equipment, necessary
changes to procedure when scaling up a reaction, etc. More than why the incidents
occurred, the video focused a great deal on the need for a strong safety culture. The CSB
emphasized that by implementing and supporting a strong culture of safety, preventing
hazards and exposures becomes a higher priority. Because universities often do not fall
within the general limitations set by OSHA and other regulatory bodies, universities are
forced to develop their own allowances and limitations.
The CSB has determined six key safety lessons to take from incidents like those
discussed in their video, “Experimenting with Danger:”
1. An academic institution … should ensure all safety hazards, including
physical hazards of chemicals, are addressed.
2. Academic institutions should ensure that practices and procedures are
in place to verify that research-specific hazards are evaluated and
mitigated.
3. Comprehensive guidance on managing the hazard unique to laboratory
chemical research in the academic environment is lacking. …
4. Research-specific written protocols and training are necessary to
manage laboratory research risk.
5. An academic institution’s organizational structure should ensure that
the safety inspector/auditor of research laboratories directly report to an
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identified individual/office with organizational authority to implement
safety improvements.
6. Near-misses and previous incidents provide opportunities for education
and improvement only if they are documented, tracked, and
communicated to drive safety change.5, 20	
  
Lesson 4, “researcher-specific protocols and training are necessary to manage laboratory
research risk,” has been demonstrated at UCLA in their actions since the 2008 accident.20
The CSB’s intent is for the research being conducted in the laboratory to be examined to
determine how to prevent exposure. Safety Data Sheets can be useful in this practice but
do not give enough of the necessary information regarding how to properly and safely
handle a hazardous chemical. The work practices required in a laboratory need to be
explicitly described for all researchers.
After the accident in 2008, UCLA was required by Cal/OSHA to spend time and
money to further develop their safety culture.15 Part of this process has been to develop
more standard operating procedures (SOPs). One use of SOPs is to describe in detail the
proper work practices that a researcher should use in the laboratory to maintain safety.
Currently, there are hundreds of chemicals included in UCLA’ SOP template library.21 At
the top of each template, there is a disclaimer: “This is an SOP template and is not
complete until: 1) lab specific information is entered into the box below 2) lab specific
protocol/procedure is added to the protocol/procedure section and 3) SOP has been
signed and dated by the PI and relevant lab personnel.”21-22 These stipulations make clear
that each SOP needs to be particular to the laboratory that will be using it, and that all
personnel must sign their acknowledgement of required use. By signing an SOP, a
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researcher is acknowledging required use (of said SOP) but also acknowledging all of the
potential hazards of the chemical in question.
SOPs can be used to assist in training about the hazards of the chemical and what
to do in case of emergency. UCLA updated their chemical hygiene plan in 2014: “[The
plan] establishes a formal written program for protecting laboratory personnel against
adverse health and safety hazards associated with exposure to potentially hazardous
chemicals…”23 The many SOPs included in the template library will help to promote the
protection of laboratory workers. However, no two laboratories will be able to use the
same SOP for a given chemical because the set up, procedure, and other reagents or
solvents being used with it may differ.

2.3. Primary Conclusions Regarding UCLA
After the fatal accident in December of 2008, UCLA was obliged to make
numerous changes to its safety program as discussed in this chapter. One of the most
useful changes was to better enforce the use of SOPs and the following of proper
procedures and protocols. SOP enforcement should make researchers more accountable
for what reactions and procedures are performed in the laboratory.

Since these

documents can be used as training tools, it allows for multiple researchers to get the same
information and learn the same techniques regardless of when the training occurs. This
should necessarily increase the consistency in the laboratory when performing the same
procedures.

In the future, the university will need to continue to increase the
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documentation of trainings. This accident has promoted UCLA to create a stronger
culture of safety. Other universities around the country have also been able to use this
unfortunate accident as a learning tool.
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CHAPTER 3: University of Minnesota
3.1. Incident Description
3.1.1. Explanation of Events
The incident, a laboratory explosion with personal injury and property damage,
at the University of Minnesota (UMN) occurred on June 17, 2014. The reaction was
started on June 16th and was intended to generate approximately 200 g of
azotrimethylsilane

(Me3SiN3)

in

poly(ethyleneglycol)

(PEG)

solution.

Chlorotrimethylsilane was reacted with sodium azide to produce Me3SiN3 with sodium
chloride as the byproduct (Equation 1).1-2

(1)

The reactants were combined in a distillation apparatus and were stirred overnight. On
the 17th, the solution was heated slowly with stirring using a magnetic stir bar. The
researcher performing the reaction was walking from his office, through the laboratory, to
the hallway and noticed that the thermometer was crooked. He went to adjust the
apparatus, and the reaction exploded. The explosion caused injuries to the researcher,
including second-degree burns, injuries to one arm and side from broken glass, and an
injured eardrum from the blast. There was also damage to the building, including the
destroyed hood and experimental setup (see Figure 7).2
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Figure 7: Damage to the fume hood due to the explosion at UMN.3

3.1.2. Adjustments to the Experiment and Possible Root Causes
The researcher had performed this reaction on numerous occasions, and while
there is some speculation regarding the cause of the explosion,2, 4 specific changes to the
reaction will be discussed first. When this reaction was originally performed, the scale
was smaller, where about half as much chlorotrimethylsilane and sodium azide were
used.1-2 Similar to the incident at UCLA, the researcher did not make adjustments to the
procedure due to the scaling up of the reaction. In both the UCLA and UMN cases, the
resulting injuries and property damage would have been somewhat mitigated by a smaller
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amount of hazardous chemicals in use since there would have been less of the hazards
present.
Another adjustment the UMN researcher made was to the diethylene glycol
dimethyl ether that was originally used as the solvent. Diethylene glycol dimethyl ether
was used in the literature and in prior runs;5 however, in an effort to give better mixing,
the solvent was changed to PEG with a molecular weight of about 300 g/mol. This
solvent change was also reported in the literature but only when producing about half the
desired product – 100 g instead of 200 g.6 When multiple variables in a reaction are
changed at the same time, there is a greater risk of something going wrong.
One possible explanation for the blast is that hydrazoic acid may have been
generated in the reaction vessel. Hydrazoic acid (HN3) is shock sensitive, and upon
heating, explosive.7-8 Though it was not one of the reagents added to the flask, it can be
generated when sodium azide reacts with acid. The solvent may have reacted with
sodium azide to generate hydrazoic acid in solution, which was being heated.2, 7 Another
similar explanation is that the PEG might not have been completely anhydrous, despite
the fact that a newly opened bottle was used. If this was the case, the water could have
provided the requisite protons needed to produce hydrazoic acid in the heated solution.2
An alternative explanation was that the magnetic stir bar had stopped moving,
which would allow unreacted sodium azide to settle on the bottom of the flask and be
overheated.2 Heated sodium azide can violently release nitrogen, which may have caused
the explosion. This possibility is realistic due to the researcher noticing the crooked
26

thermometer. If the stir bar had been working correctly, it is reasonable to theorize that
the thermometer should have remained in its correct position. If the solution had been
continuously stirred, unreacted sodium azide would not have been able to settle to the
bottom of the flask.

3.2. Safety Ramifications Due to the Incident
This incident happened about five and a half years after the death at UCLA. The
ramifications for UCLA had been an impetus for other universities around the country to
increase their cultures of safety to prevent similar incidents from occurring in their
schools’ laboratories. To this end, UMN created the Joint Safety Team (JST) (see
Section 3.4) in April of 2012, two years before the explosion.9 Similar to UCLA, UMN
administrators and safety officials implemented immediate changes to its safety program
to help prevent reoccurrences of the UCLA incident or similar accidents. The change
that may yield the most impact is the required use of “Safe Operations Cards” (SOC).
The cards are “used as a tool to complete hazard assessment and planning for research
activities.”10 These cards were originally developed by Dow Chemical in an effort to
stimulate safe practices in research laboratories. The SOCs were made available to UMN
due to a partnership with the chemical company. Dow Chemical Company formed
eleven safety partnerships in 2011 with universities across the country. This partnership
between Dow and UMN has UMN receiving $17 million from Dow over a five-year
period to “strengthen research and enable a building expansion.”11 UMN researchers had
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sparingly used these cards before, but the incident has served as a catalyst for wide spread
adoption due to increased enforcement.4 SOCs need to be completed for any reactions
completed in the laboratory. There are blank sections to be completed by the researchers:
reaction, contact information, intended conditions, hazards, and emergency shutdown.
This card was based on Dow’s creation and has been adjusted and edited to be as useful
as possible for all laboratories at UMN (see Section 3.3).
Since this incident, Professor William Tolman, the chair of the UMN chemistry
department, has initiated a limit on the scale of this particular type of reaction, and any
similar reactions, to no larger than 5 g theoretical yield.1, 4 Scaling up of reactions is quite
common in research laboratories, especially for the process of synthesizing starting
material. Issues arise when the unexpected reactions/outcomes materialize at the larger
scale. When using relatively small amounts, any potential damages from unintended
reactions can be more easily managed. Because the reaction was on a large scale, the
explosion that occurred had more material available that was able to react violently. The
greater amount of material ultimately resulted in scope of the injuries and damages to the
researcher and the laboratory, respectively. Limiting the scale of potentially dangerous
(e.g. explosive) experiments will prevent large-scale unintended reactions from
happening again, thereby reducing the overall risk of personal injury and property
damage.
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3.3. Analysis of and Changes to Preexisting Protocols
Aside from the SOC mentioned above, there are four other “cards” than can, and
should, be posted on laboratory doors or fume hoods to give any non-researchers, such as
emergency responders, or other researchers, such as those not performing the experiment
in question, information about what is happening in the laboratory.

“In Case of

Emergency,” “Sensitive Materials, Avoid,” Unattended Hazards,” and “Intended
Conditions” are the four card options.
On the “In Case of Emergency” card (Figure 8), there is contact information, but
there is also a section to describe an emergency shut down procedure.

Figure 8: SOC “In Case of Emergency” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction.10
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A number of options are listed that can be checked off (e.g. “evacuate lab,” “drop lab
jack,” “turn off ___,” etc.). The “In Case of Emergency” card allows anyone not familiar
with the particular reaction the ability to keep everyone safe while also maintaining the
integrity of the reaction.
The “Sensitive Materials” card gives options to be checked, similar to the
emergency card, but in this case, it is for what types of materials to avoid (Figure 9).

Figure 9: SOC “Sensitive Materials” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction that has
specific hazards when mixed with other materials.10
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This card allows anyone outside the laboratory to understand what should not be
introduced to the laboratory space with respect to whatever is currently being done or
materials stored in the laboratory. For instance one option that can be checked is “Air,”
meaning that whatever is in the laboratory should not come into contact with atmospheric
air. If the sensitive reaction were in a hood, this card would make it clear that it must be
kept under an inert atmosphere to avoid potentially dangerous reactions.
For any reaction left unattended, the “Unattended Hazards” card will describe
what the potential hazards are (Figure 10).

Figure 10: SOC “Unattended Hazards” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction left
unattended.10
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This card could be especially useful for emergency responders. If, for instance, the fire
alarm in the building is tripped, fire fighters will be able to determine if the reactions
occurring in the laboratory could be the reason for the alarm or if they should move on to
the next laboratory.
The “Intended Conditions” card can be used to describe the intentional
conditions of the reaction (Figure 11).

For instance, there is an option of “Keep

DARK/covered” that would help anyone to avoid destroying work by exposing the
reaction to light. This card can also be used to describe what the reaction should look
like in terms of both condition (stirring) and appearance (color).

Figure 11: SOC “Intended Conditions” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction.10
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If one of the intended conditions were not met another researcher would be able to notify
the person performing the experiment that something incorrect is happening.

The

experimenter would then be able to assess the situation to determine if the laboratory is
safe to occupy to continue work. These cards can be posted on the laboratory door so
that there is no need to enter the laboratory to assess the condition of the area. By using
the same template on every laboratory door in a building, emergency responders can be
trained to look for any hazards listed on the cards before entering a laboratory, thereby
keeping everyone safer from potential exposures to hazardous materials.

3.4. Joint Safety Team
As mentioned above, two years prior to the chemical explosion, UMN had
developed the Joint Safety Team (JST).9, 12-15 The JST consists not of faculty and staff,
but rather of graduate student and postdoctoral researchers from two departments, 1)
chemistry and 2) chemical engineering and mathematical science. One objective of this
group is to improve on safety culture at UMN. Similar to the conditions noted in Chapter
2, safety culture not only refers to the manner in which experiments are executed but also
to attitudes and the perception of those inside and outside the laboratory, other
researchers, staff members, etc.

Following the explosion in the fall of 2014, JST

implemented a new safety campaign called CARE, which represents four safety areas:
Compliance, Awareness, Resources, and Education.9, 16 Each area focuses on particular
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safety-centric themes that can be overlooked in research laboratories. There are ten
initiatives that have been introduced within the CARE campaign (see Table 1).

Table 1: Ten initiatives of the CARE campaign at UMN.9

Initiative
Identify 10 guidelines
for a safer lab
Kickoff event
Standard lab signage
Safety moments
Weekly safety note
Safety posters
Laboratory
Walkthroughs
JST website
LSO training
Cleanup week

Description
CARE Category
Document describing most important aspects
Awareness
of lab safety
Highly attended event to introduce the JST
Awareness
and identify new goals for safety culture
Templates to display hazards and contact
Compliance and
information for each lab space
Awareness
Brief discussion or presentation on a safety
Awareness and
topics at the beginning of group meetings
Education
and departmental seminars
A short safety tip sent weekly by email to
Awareness and
faculty, staff, and students
Education
5 unique posters on safety topics designed
Awareness and
and displayed
Education
Semiannual student-let audits to evaluate
Compliance
laboratory housekeeping and compliance
Website containing links, information, and
Resources and
JST content
Education
Annual session to train LSOs in their roles
Resources and
and responsibilities
Education
Week focused on reducing clutter and waste
Resources
from labs, in conjunction with DEHS

One of the ten initiatives that can help promote a strong culture of safety is the
“Weekly Safety Note,” which is a brief safety tip sent to faculty, staff, and students via
email.9 If this is sent out early in the week, it could encourage researchers to keep safety
in mind all week while planning and performing various experiments in the laboratory.
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An analogous promotion to safety is the “Safety Moment” that is either discussed at
group meetings or during departmental seminars. In either format, the Safety Moment is
at the beginning of the meeting or seminar. Similar to the weekly safety note, the safety
moment discussed can create a stronger safety culture by increasing awareness. One
example of how to use a Safety Moment is to discuss a near miss that happened in the
laboratory. A near miss can be described as anything just short of an accident.17-18 An
example is if a researcher drops a flask containing nitric acid on the floor, but the flask
does not break. The laboratory group can learn how to prevent future accidents from the
near misses that occur. Discussing the near miss, or other safety related topics, can lead
to the researchers caring more about safety in general. By having these discussions at the
beginning of the meeting instead of the end, it can emphasize the importance of a strong
safety culture by maintaining that it is not an afterthought. Both of these initiatives are
under two CARE categories: Awareness and Education.
An interesting initiative under the category of Compliance is “Laboratory
Walkthroughs.” Students lead a biannual audit assessing housekeeping and compliance
in the laboratory.9 By having the students run the audit process, there is a greater sense of
responsibility and ownership they undertake to ensure the laboratory is in compliance
with regulations. This initiative also encourages the students to be more aware of the
changes in regulations to stay in compliance whether that awareness is through the JST’s
other initiatives or not. Similarly to UCLA’s objective of creating a greater partnership
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among safety staff and researchers, this type of audit process will inevitably yield a
stronger partnership.
There is one initiative in particular in the last category, Resources, that likewise
encourages cooperation between the safety staff and researchers. The JST has initiated a
“Cleanup Week” that encourages laboratory groups to remove clutter and waste from
their laboratories.9 This cleanup can be used to eliminate excess hazards and decrease the
chance of an accident from occurring or escalating. Laboratories are able to remove any
hazardous materials that are no longer needed, thereby eliminating the hazard altogether.
The next chapter will in part discuss the similarities between UMN’s Cleanup Week and
UVM’s Chemistry Safety Day.

3.5. Primary Conclusions Regarding UMN
Though UMN had created the Joint Safety Team before the incident in their
chemistry department, new lessons were learned from the outcomes of the explosion.
Similar to UCLA, enforcement of using proper protocol and procedures will now be more
thoroughly applied, and new protocols and procedures have been developed to avoid
similar occurrences from happening in the future. The JST has been a strong source of
safety awareness at the university. If it continues to be a presence and keep safety a
priority, the number of incidents and accidents will likely decrease.
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CHAPTER 4: University of Vermont
4.1. Timeline of Change in the Safety Program at UVM
4.1.1. Development of the Hazardous Chemicals of Concern Online Inventory
The safety program at the University of Vermont (UVM), similar to other
universities, focuses not only on the chemistry department but all departments with
hazards including chemical, biological, radioactive, and physical. The Laboratory Health
and Safety Policy states UVM’s objective as “providing a healthy and safe working and
learning environment, and to supporting environmentally sound practices.”1 When
incidents occur at comparable universities, there are opportunities to strengthen the safety
culture locally. For instance, after the incident at UMN, a safety professional from UMN
delivered a seminar to the chemistry department at UVM to share experiences, results,
and actions.

Discussing the possible causes of an incident and how to prevent

recurrences in the future allows both universities to be better prepared. Incidents like the
explosion at UMN create opportunities to create a dialogue among safety staff and
laboratories researchers.
Incidents at UVM and various universities have contributed to the evolution of the
safety program at UVM. The timeline shown in Figure 12 shows a very general and
basic analysis of the safety program at UVM between 2007 and 2012.b In that five-year
span of time, the program began to evolve into the program it is today.

b

The information in the timeline was sourced from documentation maintained at UVM’s
Environmental Safety Facility.
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Figure 12: Recent timeline of change of aspects of the safety program at UVM.

One incident at UVM that sparked a great change in the safety program was a
laboratory fire. A fire started in a non-metal fume hood Memorial Day Weekend, 2007
and caused $2 million in damage/repairs and two years of delayed work. The smoke that
was generated by the fire was exhausted out of the building by the fume hood. Hence,
the smoke detectors outside of the fume hood in the laboratory were unable to detect the
fire until the fume hood was burning (Figure 13).
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Figure 13: Fire damage to the fume hood from the 2007 fire at UVM.c

Fortunately, there were no deaths or serious injuries of either researchers or emergency
personnel, but several firefighters received emergency care. After the fire, UVM’s online
chemical registry system was developed. Every researcher responsible for a laboratory
must now register that space – list all researchers in the laboratory and complete the
Hazardous Chemicals of Concern (HCOC) online chemical inventory. The Burlington
Fire Department (BFD) can access this inventory on route to any UVM building to see
what hazards are present (Figure 14).
c

Photograph is from Risk Management and Safety’s archives at UVM.
41

Figure 14: The screen Burlington Fire Department sees when logging on to the campus wide
emergency response report online.2

If there was a similar system in place before the fire in 2007, the need for emergency
medical treatment could have been more easily avoided. BFD can now see what hazards
are located in the building before or during a fire alarm or emergency call response. The
responders are safer as a direct result of updated inventories and being able to contact
someone responsible for the laboratories in a building.
Once the building to which they are responding is chosen, BFD is able to view
all hazards associated with individual laboratory spaces (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15: An example of laboratory-space specific data the Burlington Fire Department can find
when choosing to view a building’s hazards.3

All inventories are required to be updated a minimum of every six months to ensure
accuracy. The implementation of the online inventory is one part of the annual training
BFD receives from UVM Risk Management and Safety personnel. A better partnership
has been created between UVM and BFD since the fire and its resulting impacts.
Similar to UCLA’s Laboratory Hazard Assessment Tool (LHAT) the HCOC
allows for the transfer of information from researchers in a particular laboratory to a nonlaboratory member of the university. One difference between the HCOC and LHAT is
the latter focuses on hazard assessment as an informative tool as opposed to hazard
communication.4 Hazard assessment refers to the evaluation of the hazards present in the
laboratory and is accomplished by LHATs.
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Hazard communication refers to the

communication of information with anyone that may contact the hazards and is achieved
by HCOC. LHATs somewhat combine the usefulness of an SOP with informative power
though the communication of that assessment.

The evaluation of the hazards is

completed through filling out the LHAT form. Therefore, there is an opportunity to add
value to the HCOC by increasing the information that is required to be made available,
including assessing the hazards present. However, there is a fine line between offering
enough information to be useful and giving too much information. At this point, UVM is
focused on keeping the information updated to ensure that what information is present is
actually useful for emergency responders because it is accurate. BFD is able to see an
abbreviated version of the HCOC so that they are able to assess the building’s hazards
before entering it.2 Forms like the LHAT have too much information to determine and
extract the vital information to use as a quick assessment tool.
4.1.2. Development of the Chemistry Safety Committee
Another development at UVM that happened prior to the accident at UCLA was
the creation of the Chemistry Safety Committee in August of 2008.

Committee

membership includes seven to ten chemistry faculty/staff, the Laboratory Safety
Coordinator for the College of Arts and Sciences, and the Assistant Director of Risk
Management & Safety for Health and Safety, and it is chaired by a chemistry faculty
member. The Chemistry Safety Committee holds biannual meetings to examine various
safety topics ranging from recent incidents to upcoming events and seminars to ongoing
concerns. One objective of the Chemistry Safety Committee is to encourage safe work
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practices in the chemistry department. In other words, the committee looks to increase
the strength of the safety culture within all chemistry laboratories.
The Chemistry Safety Committee is similar to the Joint Safety Team at UMN in a
few ways. One aspect of the Chemistry Safety Committee that is comparable to the Joint
Safety Team is that both are focused on safety culture and its improvement in chemistry
laboratories. However, where the Chemistry Safety Committee is all faculty and staff,
the Joint Safety Team is comprised of only graduate students and post-doctoral
researchers.5 The Chemistry Safety Committee could gain some insight through another
viewpoint by adding graduate students/post-docs to the committee.

This different

perspective could add value to the Chemistry Safety Committee by ensuring that all
needs in the department are acknowledged.
The committee at UVM has already had some success in addressing its objective
of encouraging safer work practices. For example, the committee has implemented
Chemistry Safety Day. At this annual, daylong event, the entire chemistry department
uses that time to update required trainings, participate in various drills, attend a
departmental safety seminar, and engage in laboratory cleanup. Laboratory cleanup
consists of cleaning out the laboratory of old chemicals, wastes, and papers. The first
annual Chemistry Safety Day was held in May of 2012, and this has been an annual event
ever since. The first Safety Day supplied researchers with the ability to take live fire
extinguisher training and to remove old chemicals, wastes, papers, and broken equipment
from the laboratory. Chemistry is the only department to currently require the live fire
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extinguisher training to be completed by all of its researchers, faculty, and teaching
assistants. The first Chemistry Safety Day in 2012 had participation from 88% of all
researchers in the fire extinguisher training.
Of the more than 500 laboratories at UVM, the chemistry department has some of
the highest potential hazards. This department has maintained its priority status, which
includes receiving yearly safety audits.

Events like Chemistry Safety Day help to

minimize hazards and increase hazard awareness among undergraduate and graduate
students, postdoctoral researchers, faculty, and staff.
The committee focuses mainly on the research laboratories in chemistry, but it
explored how to increase safety awareness in undergraduate students taking chemistry
laboratories as a portion of general chemistry and organic chemistry classes as well. The
goal is to engage undergraduate students in laboratory safety as soon as (or before) the
students enter the laboratory. There was a small safety book that had been used in all
beginner undergraduate laboratories, and while there was some good information
contained, the book itself did little to encourage the students to take an interest in the
topic of safety. In an effort to better train undergraduate students in safety, the committee
developed a new online training tool. Two chemistry faculty members, two chemistry
staff members, and the laboratory safety coordinator for chemistry created an online
training that the students are now required to complete and need to achieve a minimum
score of 80% on an assessment prior to engaging in experimental work in the laboratory.
The training is in the format of a PowerPoint presentation, which is displayed via the
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Blackboard online learning platform, where students are able to access the training and
complete the assessment. The training itself includes the basic safety information for
instructional laboratory work including, personal preparedness, how to recognize
chemical hazards, SDS information, routes of exposure, engineering and administrative
controls, proper PPE, what to do in case of a chemical spill, housekeeping, how to
properly handle chemical waste, and emergency equipment/what to do in case of an
emergency. The feedback from the students taking the new training has been very
positive, especially any students that had previously used the safety book mentioned
above.
4.1.3. Other Changes to UVM’s Safety Program
While the Chemistry Safety Committee has been beneficial to the promotion and
improvement of safety culture within UVM’s chemistry department, there are other
factors that have facilitated changes in the safety program at the university as a whole.
As noted, the accident at UCLA was one contributing factor in the creation of UVM’s
Laboratory Safety Policy but not the only factor. In 2011, a laboratory safety working
group was created specifically to further develop laboratory safety. This group was
created as a result of safety concerns at UVM as well as incidents at both UCLA and
Yale6, d (see Figure 16).

d

In 2011, a 22-year-old undergraduate was working in a chemistry laboratory machine
shop when her hair was caught in the lathe, resulting in the researcher’s death.35
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Figure 16: Contributing factors for the creation of the laboratory safety group at UVM.

The accident at UCLA discussed in Chapter 2 made the need for a robust safety policy
quite evident.

This was one of two fatal accidents at prestigious universities that

contributed to the safety policy. The accident at Yale in 2011 involved a researcher
working in a chemistry shop on a lathe when her hair was caught in the spinning
mechanism.6 The types of laboratories vary greatly at UVM, and these accidents clearly
showed a need for a stronger safety culture. The third factor was the ending of Project
XL.e Project XL, which stands for “eXcellence and Leadership,” was a national initiative
that tests innovative ways of achieving better and more cost-effective public health and
e

“The focus of [Project XL] is on the implementation of an institution-wide laboratory
environmental management program which effectively minimizes, reuses, collects and
disposes of waste chemicals from campus teaching and research activities.”36
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environmental protection.7 Project XL determined the waste management at the
university, and it “was developed because the standard hazardous waste regulations
established under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act were preventing
laboratories in higher education from fully developing their pollution prevention
programs.”7 There was potential for a big shift in waste management due to the impeding
end of this project.
The fourth and fifth factors were the Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC) inspection of the UVM campus and the specific inspection of the chemistry
building found a number of non-compliance issues that needed to be handled. The issues
included missing documentation, labeling problems or old waste, self-inspections were
not completed, and two laboratories had significant housekeeping concerns. Overall, the
inspection cost UVM almost $20,000 in fines. The combination of these five factors
(Figure 16) led to the creation of the Laboratory Health and Safety Policy (Figure 17).
There were 15 members of the Laboratory Safety Group at the time of its
inception including representatives from general safety, radiation safety, chemical safety,
laboratory safety, biosafety, and environmental compliance; the Director of Risk
Management; two Assistant Deans for Research (College of Medicine and College of
Arts and Science); the Vice President for Research; and the Chief Compliance Officer.
The working group was convened to generate a robust Safety Policy. The reasoning
behind its creation is outlined on the first page of the policy as can be seen in Figure 17.1
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Figure 17: UVM’s Laboratory Health and Safety Policy’s general statement and reasoning behind its
creation.1

In the last few years, UVM has made a number of changes and updates to its
safety program. For example, the organizational structure within the Risk Management
& Safety (RMS) Department has been adjusted to allow for safety staff members to spend
more time with individual researchers when appropriate and needed. There is a greater
opportunity for one-on-one trainings for new principle investigators (PIs) and laboratory
safety officers in the laboratory. New trainings have been created and older trainings
have been updated, both classroom and online trainings. More targeted trainings allow
for researchers to gain specific insight before working with particular hazardous materials
or equipment. Furthermore, the safety websites have almost all been updated within the
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last five years. All of these updates and new creations have been prepared to ensure that
researchers are getting the most up-to-date information possible and that they can easily
learn about any new regulations that would affect their work or their safety procedures in
the laboratory.

4.2. Further Comparisons Among UCLA, UMN, and UVM
4.2.1. Documentation/Signage for Current Experiments
The safety program at UVM is comparable in various ways to the safety
programs at both UCLA and UMN. As previously mentioned, the HCOC at UVM is
similar to the LHAT at UCLA, though the first is more focused on hazard communication
and the latter is more about hazard assessment. Also, the Chemistry Safety Committee
and the Joint Safety Team were both created for the purpose of promoting and improving
safety culture. However, there are other comparisons to be made. For instance, UVM
uses an “Unattended Operations Form” to define what procedures are being performed in
the laboratory without any researcher present (Figure 18).
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WARNING!
UNATTENDED OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE
INSTRUCTIONS
An Unattended Operations Sign must be filled out completely and attached to the
laboratory door facing the hallway whenever any equipment, experiment, process or
operation is left unattended and could pose a potential risk to health, safety or security of
personnel or property. Users must post all applicable information, including emergency
shut-down instructions. For more info, contact safety@uvm.edu
This information is used to inform other building occupants, Physical Plant personnel,
Safety staff and other Emergency Responders in the event of an unexpected reaction,
overheating, odor or emergency.
Date:
Name:

Start Time: ________ (circle) AM
End Time: ________ (circle) AM

Phone:

Will Check Again: in #_____min’s,
in #_____hrs, in #_____day(s)

PI/Supervisor Name:

PI/Supervisor Phone:

PM
PM

The Unattended Operation taking place involve the following hazards:
Circle ALL that apply and list specifics as requested.
Equipment
Muffle Furnace
Chemical Fume Hood
Compressed Gas
Vacuum Pump
Electrical
Hot plate/Ignition Sources
Continuous Water Flowing
Other:

Hazard
Temp: ___________ (circle) F or C
What exactly is being heated in oven/furnace?
______________________________________
Chemicals in use (circle all that apply) Amount: ________
Corrosive , Toxic, Reactive, Flammable
Gas Type: _______________________
Type of oil: ______________________
Volts/Watts: __________ (circle) AC or DC
Type/Temp: ___________________________
Describe “other”:

Provide an additional description of what is taking place:
______________________________________________________________________________
Emergency Shut off is located: ___________________________________________________
Questions about this form? Contact safety@uvm.edu or go to uvm.edu/safety

Figure 18: The “Unattended Operations” form used at UVM.8
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This form is similar to the “Unattended Hazards” SOC used at UMN. The Unattended
Operations form is to be used “whenever any equipment, experiment, process or
operation is left unattended and could pose a potential risk to health, safety or security of
personnel or property.”8-9 This form was originally created in 2001, but it has been
updated as recently as 2012. Both forms are used to display information to anyone
outside the laboratory. If something happens in the laboratory, researchers, safety staff,
or emergency responders would all be able to better assess the risks of entering the
laboratory.
4.2.2. Laboratory Inspection Procedures
Another area of comparison is the safety inspection procedures at each university.
As mentioned, the UVM chemistry department laboratories are high priority.

For

auditing purposes, that means safety staff inspects the laboratories every year. Beginning
in 2012, LabCliQ has been used to track the inspections and corrective actions
required/completed for all UVM laboratories online.

Thus, the same questions are

answered regardless of the laboratory’s department or which safety professional is
completing the inspection. Adoption of the online platform was done to normalize the
auditing process, though the standardization can only go so far. In a similar manner,
UCLA laboratories are inspected using a standardized approach.10 The difference at
UCLA is that there are monthly reviews of recent inspections, and another member of the
safety staff redoes an inspection randomly chosen.10 This is to ensure the reproducibility
of the audit process. As at UVM and UCLA, UMN has an auditing checklist that has
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minimal open-ended questions to be answered.11 This, again, allows for a more
normalized auditing process. Comparing the different schools’ processes, it is clear that
normalization is the goal.
4.2.3. Greater Laboratory Training Requirements
There have been increases in the number of safety trainings at all universities
discussed here. At UVM, training has increased greatly, as illustrated in Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Safety trainings taken by UVM affiliates from 2009 through 2014.

The large increase in the number of completed trainings from 2012 to 2013 was partially
due to the increased number of required trainings for all laboratory workers and better
enforcement of the requirements. This was a period of catching up with trainings for
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many researchers. Another explanation for the large increase from 2012 to 2013 is the
implementation of the annual online refresher training. 2013 was the first year the
refresher was offered and required for all researchers that were at UVM since 2012 or
earlier. The number of completed trainings will likely drop slightly over the next few
years as researchers that have been at UVM for a number of years finish completing the
basic training requirements. Instead, new students, faculty, and staff will complete the
majority of all recorded trainings, and near the same number each year will complete the
annual refresher trainings. Similar to UVM, at UCLA and UMN trainings have been
added to the requirements for all laboratory workers. This increase in safety training
activities is targeted at ultimately generating a higher level of safety awareness.
The undergraduate training that is displayed through BlackBoard is not recorded
as part of the total trainings delivered by RMS. Roughly 3000 undergraduate chemistry
students take the safety training each academic year through BlackBoard before
performing any laboratory experiments for class. This number includes general and
organic chemistry students. This number is slightly inflated since there are students
repeating the trainings from general chemistry when they take organic chemistry.
Therefore, any student taking organic chemistry will see the same information twice,
hopefully reinforcing the culture of safety that is being cultivated.
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4.3. Past Incidents
UVM safety staff utilizes and learns from incidents that occur at other
universities, however, there have been a number of incidents at UVM and within the
chemistry department specifically.

The incidents are reported based on the injured

person’s status – either employee or student.

For employees, there have been 16

incidents between 2006 and 2012 (Figure 20).f
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Figure 20: Employee accidents in the chemistry department at UVM from 2006 through 2015 divided
by type of injury.

f

The data for Figure 20 was compiled through RMS documented reports of the incidents.
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There are not enough data points to determine any significant trends. There were no
reported incidents in 2013, 2014, and through June 2015. Lacerations were the most
common injury, 7 of the 16 accidents. The number of incidents from year to year appears
to be random, fluctuating from one to five without any steady increase or decrease in
occurrence. Continued analysis of these reports could potentially yield a trend in the
future.
Though undergraduate student accidents have not been the focus up to this point
in the discussion, UVM follows up with various injuries and accidents in the teaching
laboratories as necessary. RMS’s “follow up” process endeavors to determine the root
causes of accidents. This causation determination may be through meeting with the
researcher, observing performance of the task or experiment that was done during the
accident, or sampling for exposure. There have been 59 reported incidents in teaching
laboratories from April of 2009 to April of 2015 (Figure 21).g

g

The data for Figure 21 was compiled through RMS documented reports of the incidents.
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Figure 21: Student accidents in chemistry teaching laboratories at UVM from 2009 through 2015
divided by type of injury.

Similar to the employee records, lacerations were the most common injury, 22 of the 59
incidents. Though the number is more than a third of the total, most of the students did
not require emergency attention and care. Chemical exposures were the second most
common injury with 20 incidents being a result of exposure. Again, the high variability
and small sample size makes it very difficult to determine any significant trends. There is
a slight decrease in the number of total incidents from year to year; however, this could
be for a variety of reasons. A possible explanation is that the follow up procedures done
by both RMS and the chemistry department are having a positive effect on the awareness
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of safety in the laboratory. The chemistry department in particular has made an effort to
remove more hazardous chemicals/experiments from the teaching curriculum.

By

eliminating some of the hazards, the department is able to mitigate injuries from
occurring. Another possibility is that the injuries are simply not being reported. Injuries
that do not require medical attention are less likely to be reported since there is no need
of a formal report for insurance purposes. If injuries go unreported, the number of
incidents would be deceptively low.
In cataloging this data, an opportunity for UVM to enhance the follow up
procedure that is used at the university was identified. For instance, there is no single
form or procedure that is followed by all safety personnel when performing a follow up.
Though the questions asked may be similar and the same information may be gleaned
from the process, a more uniform procedure would be best. There is another opportunity
in the way the incidents are reported. To date, the incidents are difficult to find and trend,
regardless of the size of the data set. A more user-friendly reporting format for both
employee and student reports is needed. It is insufficient to be simply reporting the
accidents if reports cannot be found easily and aggregate data obtained. If all incidents
were collected in the same database, potential trends could be found. This analysis,
absent from current procedures, would ultimately help to prevent serious injuries and
accidents from recurring in the future.
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4.4. Primary Conclusions Regarding UVM
UVM has been motivated by the incidents that have happened at the university
and other universities around the country to further develop the safety program. Various
accidents are discussed in RMS-delivered classroom trainings to make researchers aware
of what is progressing around them at similar universities.

It is emphasized that

researchers need to be more aware in general of their surroundings, especially when
working with hazardous chemicals, materials, or equipment in the laboratories on
campus. UVM uses not only the accidents that happen in chemistry laboratories or with
hazardous chemicals but other hazards as well to ensure all students, faculty, and staff are
working safely with the hazardous materials or equipment.
However, data collection is insufficient to determine trends and learn what types
of accidents can and should be prevented. It is not enough to collect the data, it also
needs to be evaluated and cataloged in a useful way. If UVM is to continue to learn from
accidents, there needs to be a better way to evaluate steps that need to be done to avoid
reoccurrences.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
5.1. Training Recommendations
Incidents and their repercussions at UCLA, UMN, and UVM were discussed at
length above, but further steps after completing all of the safety adjustments have not yet
been considered. UCLA has made great progress to increase the strength of the safety
culture at the university as described in Chapter 2.1-2 The numerous SOP templates
available for researchers to adapt to their own procedures are immensely useful.2 If the
researchers use them appropriately as a tool to create their own SOPs, the template
library will be invaluable to the research community. Aside from the SOP library, the
increased training and documentation will help to keep everyone safer – those working in
the laboratories as well as any emergency personnel that may need to enter the laboratory
space at any time. The number of trainings received by UCLA affiliates has increased
steadily from 2007 through 2012, as illustrated in Figure 22.

Figure 22: Total trainings received by UCLA affiliates from 2007 through 2012. The blue portion
represents online trainings, and the red portion represents classroom trainings.1
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Similar to UVM, there is likely some amount of back training students, faculty,
and staff that had not previously received required trainings from 2009 through 2011 as
can be recognized through the large increase in total training participants. In future years,
it may be possible to see a slightly fluctuating plateau of trainings completed, such as
from 2011 to 2012, as it will be only new researchers completing the majority of training
courses required. One aspect of the UCLA training program that is not seen at every
university is a matrix to determine what trainings are required based on what tasks that
specific researcher is performing in the laboratory.

The matrix includes different

categories of required trainings for those working with animals, with shop equipment,
responsible for a laboratory, etc.3 At UVM, there are a number of online and classroom
training requirements for every laboratory worker that are clearly indicated; however, it
can be difficult for a researcher to determine which of the more specialized trainings are
also required and for whom these requirements apply.4 A more precise training matrix
would be a beneficial addition to the safety program for researchers to be better able to
complete the necessary requirements.

5.2. Incident Follow Up Procedures and Reporting
Even with all of the progress already made, there are still more steps to be taken
to ensure the safest workplace/laboratory possible. The worst outcome after the prior
incidents would be to become complacent with the safety program. As noted in Chapter
1, there is always room for improvement, features to learn new best practices, and new
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regulations to follow. One area that could use improvement at UVM is the recording and
tracking of accidents and injuries that happen on campus. The current process of incident
reporting and follow up is outlined in Figure 23.

Figure 23: Reporting process for accidents and injuries at UVM.

The accident or injury goes through the same reporting and follow up procedure whether
the injured person is an employee or a student. After the injured person has received
medical treatment – anything from a bandage to emergency care at the hospital – his or
her laboratory supervisor will complete the report to send in to RMS, ideally within 72
hours of the incident.
After the incident is reported, the Laboratory Safety Coordinator from RMS
assigned to that department does a follow up with the person(s) that had experienced the
injury or accident and likely his or her PI. As discussed in Section 4.3, the follow up
process endeavors to determine the root causes of the accident. Depending on the
incident, other researchers in the laboratory may be included in the discussion to
determine root causes. Follow up may include a simple discussion among researchers
and safety staff, a cooperation to develop a safer procedure, exposure monitoring during
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experimentation, or a number of other methods depending on the accident or injury in
question, including those described in Section 4.3.

The overall goal is to prevent

additional similar injuries or accidents from happening. After the follow up is completed,
the RMS report is sent to another member of RMS for insurance purposes or it is filed. It
is difficult at best to find information about a specific type of injury because there is no
useful way of sorting the reports. A database needs to be created to make the reports—
from the PI as well as the report from RMS staff—useful for tracking purposes and to
determine if any similar accidents happened in the past.

5.3. Final Thoughts
As detailed in Section 3.3 and Section 4.1, UMN and UVM have similar signage
for any operations left unattended. However, UMN has other signage that could be
useful for UVM to mimic. For instance, fillable forms that can communicate more
information to anyone outside of the laboratory could be useful. The availability of one
or multiple forms that can be tailored to a specific reaction, while still following a
particular template would allow for valuable information to be conveyed. Similar to the
SOCs that UMN uses, concise information that can be easily understood by emergency
responders would be beneficial.
The Chemistry Safety Committee was thoroughly discussed in Section 4.1.2,
however, most departments at UVM do not have specific safety committees. If each
department created a committee, events like safety days could be held in other buildings
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across campus. Though the chemistry department has laboratories with some of the
highest hazards on campus, it is not the only department that would benefit from an
increase in the overall culture of safety. At a minimum, each department should have an
assigned faculty or staff member to oversee the building’s safety needs and coordinate
with RMS to increase the culture of safety.
Ultimately, the safety culture at universities needs to be top priority to minimize
accidents and maximize laboratory effectiveness. If no other reason resonates with
researchers, laboratory accidents impede progress in research. Therefore, universities
need to continue to develop their safety programs and promote safety culture.
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